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PBA FEDERAL PRACTICE COMMITTEE

FEDERAL PRACTICE NEWS
Rules Changes
On Dec. 1, 2015, the first changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since 2010 went into effect. Professor
Steven Baicker-McKee describes and discusses those changes.

Ch-Ch-Ch-Ch Changes:
Turn and Face the Strange…2015 Amendments to the FRCP
By Steven Baicker-McKee
On Dec. 1, 2015, a set of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect. These amendments
were extremely controversial, drawing over 2,000 comments during the public comment periods.1 Plaintiffs’ lawyers
believe the amendments are just the latest move by the Supreme Court to protect big corporate defendants and
limit plaintiffs’ access to the courts.2 Defendants’ lawyers believe the amendments do not go far enough in curbing
disproportionate and abusive discovery.3 As is so often the case, the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle. Only
time will tell, however, as we wait to see how the courts interpret these new provisions.
This article will provide a summary of the most controversial of the amendments, as well as some of the provisions
that did not draw as much attention, but yet have the potential for significant change in federal court practice. It is
not intended to be an exhaustive catalog of each amended provision—but you can find the text of each amended rule
together with detailed commentary in the 2016 Edition of the Federal Civil Rules Handbook, published by Thomson
Reuters. Additionally, I and a co-author of that treatise have written some blog posts on the amendments, which you
can find here.

Rule 1
Let’s start at the very beginning, with the amendment to Rule 1.4 Rule 1 contains the iconic, and largely
aspirational, language requiring that the rules be construed to secure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.”5 The amendment expressly imposes that duty on the parties, whereas the prior
language could be read to apply only to the courts.
This change may turn out to be minor, and readers may wonder why it is on this list of important changes.
Sanctions, or at least the potential for sanctions, is the reason. Although the Advisory Committee Notes—not
binding, but persuasive authority for construing the amendments6—suggest that the committee did not intend to
create a new source of sanctions, such as a Motion for Sanctions for Violations of Rule 1,7 it would not be surprising
to see motions for sanctions under other rules reference violations of Rule 1. For example, a party might move
for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b)8—which lists failure to follow the rules as one basis for involuntary
dismissal—asserting that the opposing party had repeatedly violated Rule 1 by acting in a way that frustrated the
speedy or inexpensive determination of the case.

Let’s Get this Party Started
The 2015 amendments contain a couple of changes designed to get the litigation process moving more quickly at
the outset. The first is an acceleration in the time for service of the complaint and summons. Rule 4 used to allow up
to 120 days from the date of filing to effectuate service, and that period is now reduced to 90 days.9 While 90 days
is typically more than enough time to serve the defendants, it might become a challenge if the plaintiff attempts the
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waiver of service process and the defendant declines. That process could consume a meaningful portion of the 90-day
period, leaving the plaintiff squeezed for time. Anticipating this, the amendment also adds language allowing the court
to expand the time for service for “good cause.”10
The second is in Rule 16, and it decreases the time for the court to hold the initial status conference from 120
days to 90 days after a defendant has been served.11 This amendment not only advances the time for the initial status
conference, it has the collateral effect of accelerating discovery as well. Parties may not serve discovery until they have
conducted their Rule 26(f ) discovery conference, which typically occurs approximately 14 days before the court’s
initial Rule 16 conference.12 Thus, discovery is likely to commence earlier under the amended rules.
The final acceleration occurs in amendments to Rules 26 and 34 allowing for early service of document requests.13
In order to make the Rule 26(f ) discovery conference and the initial Rule 16 conference more productive, parties may
now serve Rule 34 document requests before the Rule 26(f ) conference, as long as more than 21 days have elapsed
since service of the summons and complaint on the defendant.14 The purpose of this early discovery is to allow parties
to identify potential problems with document production (and particularly production of Electronically Stored
Information, or ESI) and address those problems earlier in the process.15 Note, however, that the response is not
accelerated—it is still due 30 days after the Rule 26(f) conference.16

What’s All this Fuss About Proportionality?
One of the amendments that drew the most fire from those submitting comments was the revision addressing
proportionality—the balancing of the benefits and burdens of discovery. The concept of proportionality has been in
the rules since 1983, but the amendment changes proportionality from a limitation on discovery to part of the core
definition of the scope of discovery.17
Prior to the amendments, the scope of discovery, found in Rule 26(b)(1) was “nonprivileged matter relevant to
any party’s claim or defense.”18 A separate provision required the court to limit discovery if the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.19 Worried that courts were not giving sufficient consideration to
proportionality, the 2015 amendment changed the definition of the scope of discovery to be “nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case …” 20
Besides moving the proportionality language, the amendment also flips the order of two of the listed factors
for evaluating proportionality. Prior to the amendment, the “amount in controversy” was the first listed factor.
The amendment puts “the importance of the issues at stake in the action” first, to underscore that the amount in
controversy is not the only or driving consideration.21
Again, readers might be tempted to ask why all the angst about this amendment—it merely moves a concept
already found in Rule 26(b) to a different subsection of Rule 26(b), retaining the same factors in a slightly different
order. The difference, one might argue, is that before the amendments, the core definition of the scope of discovery
was very broad, and parties then had to work to limit it. After the amendment, the core definition has become more
narrow.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers worry that proportionality will become a new tool that defendants increasingly use to avoid
discovery. The fear is that parties responding to discovery will routinely object to requests based on proportionality
considerations, and the burden will then shift to the requesting party to file a motion to compel (and perhaps the
burden of proving proportionality will shift from the responding party to the requesting party as well). This will lead
to more motion practice, which translates to more cost and delay—the exact opposite of the articulated aim of the
amendments.
Further narrowing of the scope of discovery occurred when the amendments eliminated another provision of Rule
26(b)(1). The old rule allowed the court to expand the scope of discovery from matter relevant to “a party’s claim
or defense” to matter relevant to “the subject matter involved in the action;” in other words, relevant to a claim or
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defense that a party is seeking to develop but that is not yet pleaded. The Advisory Committee Notes suggest that this
provision was seldom invoked, so they decided to eliminate it.22

Ask and Ye Shall Pay
Those seeing an alarming restriction on discovery were also concerned about an amendment to Rule 26(c) covering
protective orders. Since the Supreme Court’s Oppenheimer Fund case in 1979,23 it has been settled that a court may
shift the costs of discovery from the responding party to the requesting party. The 2015 amendment to Rule 26(c)
simply codified this case law, making that authority explicit (and explicitly authorizing parties to seek protective
orders shifting those costs).24 A contingent of the bar—primarily plaintiffs’ lawyers—believe that this express authority
will spur more motions to shift costs and make courts more likely to grant those motions.25 However, the Advisory
Committee Notes emphasize that the amendment “does not imply that cost-shifting should become a common
practice.”26

I Object. But I Might Not Really Mean It.
One amendment that has not drawn as much attention as some of the more controversial amendments, but
which has the potential to be extremely disruptive, is an amendment to Rule 34.27 Rule 34 received a number of
amendments, some not particularly significant. For example, prior to December 1, 2015, there was a curious lack of
parallel language between the provisions governing objections to interrogatories and objections to document requests.
Objections to interrogatories were required to be stated with specificity under Rule 33, but Rule 34 did not impose
that requirement expressly for objections to document requests.28 Courts had long construed both rules similarly in
terms of the manner of stating objections, however.29 That disparity has been remedied, and Rule 34 now also requires
that objections to document requests be stated with specificity.30 Likewise, Rule 34 technically requires the responding
party to make responsive documents available for inspection, but in practice parties often simply provide copies of the
responsive documents.31 That practice is now officially sanctioned.32
The more significant change is found in a new sentence added to Rule 34(b)(2)(C), which reads, “An objection
must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”33 The purpose of
the rule amendment is laudable—to let the requesting party know whether it is worth the cost of contesting the
objection.34 If the responding party did not withhold any documents on the basis of an objection, it may not make
sense to challenge the objection. Unnecessary motion practice can thus be avoided, reducing cost and delay.
Note that the rule does not require a listing of the documents that a party is withholding—the equivalent of
a privilege log.35 Rather, a simple statement or description of the documents withheld will suffice.36 For example,
a responding party might object to a request that has no time parameters as overly broad and burdensome, then
advise the requesting party that the responding party is withholding documents more than ten years old. In that
circumstance, the rule is straightforward, fair, and easy to apply.
In other circumstances, however, the rule might prove thorny. For example, if a request is vague or ambiguous, and
susceptible to multiple meanings, the responding party may have to attempt to discern the various potential meanings
of the request and conduct a document review or analysis to determine if it has documents responsive to one of the
alternative meanings that it is withholding on the basis of the objection. This could be a difficult, time-consuming,
and expensive.

Oops! I Just Deleted All the Emails
One of the more dramatic changes occurred in Rule 37(e).37 Prior to Dec. 1, 2015, Rule 37(e) contained a
narrow safe harbor for the destruction of ESI through the routine operation of a computer system. Courts addressed
general questions of spoliation either through their general powers over cases on their dockets or, if they had entered a
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preservation order, through their contempt powers.38 None of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly addressed
spoliation sanctions. As a consequence, the cases were not consistent on the standards for spoliation sanctions, with
some courts imposing them for mere negligence and others requiring a heightened degree of misconduct.
With respect to ESI, “that was then, and this is now.” New Rule 37(e) creates a national, uniform standard
for imposition of spoliation sanctions for failure to preserve ESI.39 As a starting point, the rule establishes three
prerequisites for any sanctions. A judge may not impose any sanctions at all related to spoliation of ESI unless: 1) there
was a duty to preserve the evidence (which can arise before litigation is filed so long as it was reasonably anticipated);
2) the party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the evidence (the comments indicate that perfection is not the
expected standard, and that loss through an accident might not be sanctionable); and 3) the information cannot be
restored or replaced through additional discovery.40
If those three prerequisites are satisfied, there are two levels of sanctions available to the judge. If the judge finds
prejudice to the other party, the judge may impose measures “no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice.”41 Such
measures might include precluding the guilty party from using certain of its evidence or making certain arguments.42 It
might also include certain instructions to the jury, but explicitly may not include the vary harsh sanction of an adverse
inference instruction to the jury—telling the jury that they may, or must, conclude that the lost evidence would have
been harmful to the party failing to preserve it.43
The most draconian sanctions, such as the adverse inference instruction sanction or dispositive sanctions like
dismissal or judgment, are reserved for the most culpable conduct. If the court finds that the party failed to preserve
ESI for the specific purpose of depriving another party of the use of that information in the litigation, then the court
may impose those severe sanctions.44

Goodbye Forms
Lastly, the 2015 amendments abrogated Rule 84, which was the rule that established and blessed the federal forms.
Rule 84 previously stated, in its entirety, “The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the
simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”45
Thus, the forms in the Appendix were deemed sufficient under the rules—anyone using the forms could rest
assured that they were unassailable in terms of the sufficiency of the form itself (leaving aside the content, of course).46
Now, while the forms are still available online as a resource, and while many district and appellate courts sponsor their
own websites with additional exemplar forms, these forms no longer have any assurance of sufficiency.
The Advisory Committee Notes state that the forms are unnecessary, that their original purpose—namely,
illustrating the type of simplicity and brevity the Rules envisioned for federal practice—has long since been fulfilled.47
Others attribute a different explanation for the forms’ impending departure: frustration with the perceived dissonance
between the austerity of the official pleading forms and the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions in Twombly and Iqbal.48
Following abrogation, only two official forms survived, both repositioned to Rule 4 (namely, a form that requests,
and a form that consents to, a waiver of service of a summons).49

Only Time Will Tell
Will the amendment moving proportionality from Rule 26(b)(2) into Rule 26(b)(1) effect a substantial change
on the frequency and vigor with which the parties and the courts apply proportionality? Will the codification of the
authorization to shift fees to the requesting party increase the number of applications for fee shifting or the frequency
with which the courts grant such applications? Will the change to Rule 1 spur motions for sanctions invoking the new
language?
Only time will tell. As of January 21—approximately 52 days after the effective date of the amendments, a
quick Westlaw search suggests that there are already 24 opinions addressing the amendments. Remember that the
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amendments affect not only newly filed cases, but pending cases as well, unless the court “determines that applying
them in a particular action would be infeasible or work an injustice.”50
A cursory survey of those cases suggests that proportionality and the amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) are drawing
the most motion practice. Of the 24 cases, 20 focused on the amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), 3 focused on the
amendments to Rule 1, 1 addressed the amendments to Rule 37(e), and 1 addressed the amendments to Rule 4(m).51
Interestingly, a search of the same date range, but one year earlier, turned up 20 cases citing to the proportionality
provision then located in Rule 26(b)(2)—precisely the same number citing to the proportionality provision in the
amended rule. Thus, based on this non-scientific survey lacking any statistical significance, the volume of cases does
not appear to have increased as a result of the amendments. Now, whether the courts are granting these motions with
any greater frequency is a different question, but that will have to wait for another article.
Mr. Baicker-McKee is an Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law, following a complex litigation practice of almost 25 years at
Babst Calland, where he remains of counsel. Professor Baicker-McKee is co-author of the Federal Civil Rules Handbook, a leading work for lawyers in
federal court, and A Student’s Guide to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, used in US law schools across the country. He is also co-author of Learning
Civil Procedure, a law school text book, and Mastering Multiple Choice—Federal Civil Procedure, a study aid for the bar examination and for law
students, and is a co-author/editor of the Federal Litigator, a monthly publication summarizing developments in federal practice. Professor BaickerMcKee is “AV”-rated by Martindale-Hubbell, named a “Key Author” by West Publishing Company, regularly selected as a Pennsylvania “Super Lawyer,”
elected to the Academy of Trial Lawyers, and recognized in The Best Lawyers of America, and was voted Professor of the Year by the students at
Duquesne.
1 See, e.g., Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, April 2014,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/
advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-april-2014.
2 See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal
Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1083 (2015).
3 See, e.g., John J. Jablonskia1 Alexander R. Dahl, The 2015 Amendments To
The Federal Rules Of Civil Procedure: Guide To Proportionality In Discovery And
Implementing A Safe Harbor For Preservation, 82 Def. Couns. J. 411 (2015).
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 159, 115 S.Ct. 696, 702, (1995).
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
10 Id.
11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2).
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1).
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(2); 34(b)(2)(A).
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(2)
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(d) and 34(b)(2)(A) advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A).
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 2393 (1978).
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
25 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 2, at 1121-22.
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.
Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b) to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
Id.
Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C) advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
Id.
Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
See, e.g., Baicker-McKee, Janssen, and Corr, Federal Civil Rules Handbook, Pt. III, Rule
37 (2015 ed.).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments. Note that the original
proposed amendment applied to spoliation of all forms of information, ESI, paper, or
otherwise. Based on public comments, the Advisory Committee narrowed the scope
to ESI, observing that public comments suggested that the existing approach was
working adequately for paper documents.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(1) advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e)(2).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 84.
See, e.g., Baicker-McKee, Janssen, and Corr, Federal Civil Rules Handbook, Pt. III, Rule
84 (2015 ed.).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 84 advisory comm. notes to 2015 amendments.
See, e.g., Sara Fevurly, Down Go the Forms: the Abrogation of Rule 84 and the Official
Forms of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 U. Kan. L. Rev. 325 (2015).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 86(a)(2)(B).
Note that these add up to 25 because one case spent considerable time on the
amendments to both Rule 26(b)(1) and Rule 1.
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Rules Changes (continued)

CASE SUMMARIES

The U.S. District Court for the Western District – updated
its Patent Jury Instructions on Dec. 5, 2015. See Model
Patent Jury Instructions.

Summaries of notable Third Circuit and Pennsylvania
district court decisions issued between October and
December 2015 that involved issues of federal practice or
provided a particularly thorough discussion of applicable
law. All cases are linked to Casemaker.

Hon. L. Felipe Restrepo, U.S. Court of Appeals
By a vote of 82-6 the U.S. Senate on Jan. 11, 2016
confirmed Judge Restrepo’s appointment. The roll
call vote results are posted here: http://www.senate.
gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.
cfm?congress=114&session=2&vote=00001. He received his
commission on Jan. 13, 2016.

Status of Judicial Vacancies
U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
• There is one vacancy.

U.S. District Court, Western District of PA
• On July 30, 2015, President Obama nominated Judge
Susan P. Baxter, Judge Robert J. Colville and Judge
Marilyn J. Horan to fill the three vacancies in the
United States District Court for the Western District
of Pennsylvania. A Senate Judiciary Committee hearing
on these nominees was held Dec. 9, 2015. Although
the Judiciary Committee on January 28 approved Judge
Baxter and Judge Horan for a full Senate vote, the
Committee did not place Judge Colville on that week’s
agenda.

U.S. District Court, Eastern District of PA
• On July 30, 2015, President Obama nominated Judge
John M. Younge to fill the vacancy in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
A Senate Judiciary Committee hearing was held Dec. 9,
2015.
• There is one vacancy (due to Judge Restrepo’s elevation to
the Court of Appeals).

Third Circuit Precedential Opinions
Witasick v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., 803
F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2015) (Insurance/Jurisdiction) – After
discussing whether certain types of docket entries made
via the CM/ECF system can satisfy Rule 58’s “separate
document” requirement (text entries-usually; others-no) and
whether the “contingent” notice of appeal filed by the pro se
appellant conferred appellate jurisdiction (yes), the Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
of Witasick’s claims against his insurer because a prior
settlement agreement between the parties unambiguously
released all claims and contained a covenant not to sue.
U.S. v. Foy, 803 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2015) (Criminal Law
& Procedure) – The Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied
Foy’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion seeking to vacate an order of
civil commitment issued by the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Missouri. The Court of Appeals
evaluated whether the district court had jurisdiction under
(1) 18 U.S.C. § 4247(h); (2) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); (3) Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(d); (4) 28 U.S.C. § 2255; or (5) 28 U.S.C. §
2241. Because none of these bases gave the district court
jurisdiction to determine if it should grant the motion
(because the district court did not issue the original
commitment order and because petitioner was not serving a
sentence), the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s
denial and remanded for a determination of whether the
district court should transfer the case to Western District of
Missouri pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir.
2015) (Constitution) – Plaintiffs sued the City of New
York, asserting that through the NYPD, the City conducted
since January 2002 a wide-ranging surveillance program
that singled out, on the basis of religion, those in the
Muslim community “to monitor the lives of Muslims, their
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